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Recognition of High School Student Organizations:
Constitutional Protection of Associational Rights
Although the United States Supreme Court has addressed many first
amendment issues involving the high school community, it has never
directly addressed the issue of students' rights of association at the high
school level.' This issue has arisen, however, in the lower courts, generally
when students request official recognition2 in an attempt to organize
discussion or promotion of political or partisan views and are refused such
recognition on the grounds of general school board policies forbidding
organizations which support one point of view or which espouse political
ideas.3 This note addresses the question of whether a school board may
constitutionally withhold official recognition from a high school political
organization and suggests that the standards expressed for college students
in Healy v. James4 should be applied to the high school community when
'See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process requirements in student
suspensions); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(students' rights to symbolic expression); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (teachers'
constitutional rights). The lower courts have also dealt with nonassociational first
amendment rights. See, e.g., St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974) (freedom from
punishment without personal guilt); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971)
(distribution of controversial material); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F.
Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (reinstating students expelled for distribution of underground
newspaper); Young v. State, 109 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (illegal search and seizure).
See also Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 612 (1970); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational
Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970); Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
The issue of high school students' associational rights has, however, received attention
in the lower courts. E.g., Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Beresh,
361 F. Supp. 253, 254 (E.D. Mich. 1973) ("Absent a threat to the orderly operation of the
school, to deny recognition to a student group for the reason that it advocates 'controversial'
ideas is patently unconstitutional.").2Withholding official recognition can entail a denial of any or all privileges associated
with official recognition. For example, denial of the use of physical facilities for meeting
purposes, denial of the use of communications media such as the school newspaper, bulletin
boards or public address system; or denial of funding from the school. While the withholding
of official recognition may not pose an absolute denial of associational rights, the difficulty of
forming and publicizing an organization and of finding satisfactory meeting facilities without
official recognition may cause, in effect, a denial of associational rights.
-Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972). The school authorities reasoned that
the school should not support or appear to support partisan groups. There was also concern
that a political club might be a divisive influence in the school. See also Dixon v. Beresh, 361
F. Supp. 253, 254 (E.D. Mich. 1973), where school authorities stated that the school would be
impaired if "any numbers and types" of student organizations were allowed to "proliferate."
4408 U.S. 169 (1972). See notes 61, 62, 69-72 infra & text accompanying. Petitioners,
seeking to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at a state-supported
college, were denied recognition as a campus organization. The Court held that once the
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"students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules
of the school authorities." 5
SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY-THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
Historically, students in the United States have been denied many
rights and privileges upon their entry into public schools and universities.6
The control that schools wield over students is derived primarily from two
students filed application for official recognition of their organization in conformance with
requirements, the burden was on the college officials to justify rejection and that insofar as the
denial of recognition was based on an assumed relationship with the national SDS, a result of
disagreement with the group's philosophy, or a consequence of fear of disruption for which
there was no support, the college's decision violated the petitioners' first amendment
associational interests.
Much of the discussion in Healy is derived from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See notes 48-54 infra & text accompanying. In
Tinker the petitioners, three public school children, were suspended from school for wearing
black armbands to school in protest of the government's policy in Vietnam. The Court held
that the students' conduct was within the protection of the free speech clause of the first
amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that first amendment
rights were available to teachers and students.
5Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
This note will deal only with first amendment rather than fourteenth amendment
implications of official recognition of high school political organizations. A possible
alternative challenge to rules which prohibit some high school political organizations while
allowing other politically oriented organizations could be made on equal protection grounds.
For example, the Court in Tinker noted that the school authorities did not purport to prohibit
the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance; only the black armbands
worn in protest of the Vietnam War were singled out for prohibition. The Court went on to
state: "Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion . . . is not
constitutionally permissible." Id. at 511. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit showed displeasure with
a school rule that allowed for recognition of certain politically oriented organizations while
denying recognition to others. Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972). As freedom of
association is a fundamental right, see notes 57-59, 63 infra, such a challenge could have a
good chance of success.
This note does not deal with nonpolitical organizations such as secret societies or
fraternal or social organizations which may not receive first amendment protection. See
generally Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1966); Passel v. Forth Worth Independent School Dist., 453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).
6See Comment, College Administration May Not Unjustifiably Deny Official Recog-
nition to a Student Organization, 19 N.Y.L.F. 159 (1973). See also Stevenson v. Wheeler
County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (student suspended for wearing a
moustache); Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1966) (membership in off-campus "secret" fraternity or sorority forbidden); Board
of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) (married students not allowed to
participate in extracurricular activities); Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E.
400 (1902) (student denied the right to compel testimony from adverse witnesses at expulsion
hearing); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) (student
dismissed without reason, not reinstated because she signed a waiver of certain rights against
the university); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 748 (1943) (medical students denied the right to cross examine at an expulsion
hearing); Passel v. Forth Worth Independent School Dist., 453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970) (students below rank of college not allowed to join fraternities or sororities).
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS
sources: legislative grants of authority and the common law, most notably
the doctrine of in loco parentis.
State statutes generally grant broad rulemaking powers to local school
officials, usually the school board. Most of these statutes allow the school
officials to make and enforce rules for the government and management of
the school property, employees and pupils.7 Early court cases construed
such legislative grants of power quite broadly, showing great deference to
the school administrative decisionmaking process.8 One such case, in
which a student was denied readmission to a university because she refused
to answer questions about a letter published in a local newspaper charging
university officials with improper conduct, illustrates this deference:
The maintenance of discipline, the upkeep of the necessary tone and
standards of behavior in a body of students . . . is, of course, a task
committed to its faculty and officers; not to the courts. It is a task which
demands special experience ... and the officers must, of necessity, be left
untrammelled in handling the problems which arise, as their judgment
and discretion may dictate .... 9
Further, the courts advanced an "implied contract" theory of the student-
administration relationship:
Every student, upon his admission into an institution of learning,
impliedly promises to submit to, and be governed by, all the necessary and
proper rules and regulations which have been, or may thereafter, be
adopted for the government of the institution .... 10
7The Indiana statute is typical of such grants of authority:
In carrying out the school purposes of each school corporation, its governing
body acting on its behalf shall have the following specific powers:
(17) To prepare, make, enforce, amend and/or repeal rules, regulations and
procedures for the government and management of the schools, property, facilities
and activities of the school corporation, its agents, employees and pupils and for the
operation of its governing body, which rules, regulations and procedures may be
designated by any approproate title such as "policy handbook," "by-laws," "rules
and regulations."
IND. CODE § 20-5-2-2 (1971). See also CAL. EDUc. CODE § 1052 (West 1975); ILL REv. STAT. ch.
122 §§ 10-22.6, 10-22.10 (1975).
8See, e.g., Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612 (1970).9Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 A. 882, 883 (1924). Accord, Stevenson v.
Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Passel v. Fort Worth
Independent School Dist., 453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); see Goldstein, Reflections
on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612 (1970).
10State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 286 (1882). See generally Anthony v.
Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 491, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 440 (1928); Note, Private Government
on the Campus - Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963). But
see notes 38, 39 infra & text accompanying, courts no longer accept the implied contract or
privilege theories of education.
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Even in recent cases the courts have acknowledged the need for school
officials to have comprehensive authority to promulgate and enforce rules
designed to prescribe and control student conduct and to advance the
school's educational goals." Courts have said that regulations for which
there is a rational basis12 should be upheld and that adherence to
reasonable rules as to time, place and manner may be demanded.13
Much of the non-statutory tradition of administrative authority in
public education 14 is built on the doctrine of in loco parentis. Simply
stated, the doctrine provides that the school takes the place of the parent.
The classic statement of the doctrine comes from Blackstone:
[A father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed.5
"See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
id. at 526 (dissenting opinion); Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960
(5th Cir. 1972); ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
12E.g., Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969). This
case involved a petition to enjoin enforcement of clean shaving regulations adopted by public
high school authorities. In denying the petition, the district court held that the mere fact that
moustaches and beards grown by public high school students had never created any incidents
or disruption in the school system did not warrant the conclusion that a regulation adopted by
school officials was unreasonable or arbitrary especially where the regulation was adopted in
good faith and was not racially oriented. See Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist.,
453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Passel involved a class suit to enjoin a school district
and board of education from enforcing a regulation adopted for the purpose of implementing
a statute prohibiting fraternities, sororities and secret societies in public schools below the
rank of college. The court held that such prohibition did not deprive members of such
organizations of any personal or civil right guaranteed to them by the state or federal
constitutions. See also Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d
278, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966). In Robinson the constitutionality of a statute forbidding student
membership in off-campus sororities or fraternities was upheld. The court relied on the
school board's contention that the harm done by such societies outweighed the good and that
they were "inimical" to the government, discipline and morale of the pupils, to decide that
there was a rational basis for the statute and that it should therefore be upheld. The court
went on to differentiate adults' and college students' constitutional rights from those of
adolescents.
13Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). Restrictions as to time, place and manner are not,
however, confined to the school setting. See e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)
(demonstration by non-inmates at county jail); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (civil
rights demonstration at Baton Rouge courthouse).
14Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969). See R.
CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. McPHEE, THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLS 80-109, 157-85 (1965); L. CUNNINGHAM, COMMUNITY POWER: IMPLICATIONS FOR
EDUCATION IN THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 27, 33 (R. Cahill & S.
Hencley eds. 1964); Eliot, Toward An Understanding of Public School Politics, 53 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1032 (1959).
151 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.
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The Supreme Court still recognizes the interplay of parent and teacher in
the rearing of children, though perhaps in a manner somewhat different
from that described by Blackstone:
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the par-
ents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society .... [P]arents and
others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designated to aid
discharge of that responsibility. 16
School officials standing in loco parentis must nevertheless take care
not to undermine parental authority. 17 Most parents, as members of the
community, expect the high school to concentrate on transmitting basic
information and the mores of the surrounding society' s and feel that while
schools should not be rigid disciplinary institutions, neither should they be
open forums. As Justice Black observed:
[C]ertainly a teacher is not paid to go into school and teach subjects the
State does not hire him to teach as part of its selected curriculum. Nor are
public school students sent to the schools at public expense to broadcast
political or any other views to educate and inform the public ...
[T]axpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age they
need to learn, not teach.19
Thus, the public school student is viewed as a passive consumer of
administration and parent approved material, rather than as an active
participant in his own education.
The secondary school has been said to be distinguishable from higher
levels of education in that it, more so than the college or university, acts in
loco parentis with respect to minors.2 0 There is also authority that high
16Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
17E.g., Comment, Colleges and Universities: The Demise of In Loco Parentis, 6 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 715 (1971); see note 45 infra & text accompanying. But see Mailloux v. Kiley,
323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), where a high school teacher wrote a slang word for sexual
intercourse on the blackboard and discussed it with his eleventh grade students as an example
of a taboo word. The teaching method was not shown to have general support of the teaching
profession or that part of the profession to which he belonged but was relevant to the
teacher's subject and students and was regarded by experts of significant standing as serving a
serious educational purpose and used by the teacher in good faith. The court held that the
teacher could not be suspended or discharged for using the method without notice, by
regulation or otherwise, that he should not use that method. The court noted, however, that
the secondary school stands more clearly than the university in loco parentis and is closely
governed by a school board selected by a local community.
"sMailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971) (dictum).
19Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
2OMailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971) (dictum). Thus, secondary school
teachers are sometimes said not to possess that full measure of academic freedom that is
allowed their university counterparts. McKeown, The Fallacies of Academic Freedom and
Professional Rights, 60 NASSP BULL. 57 (1976).
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school students, because of their age, do not enjoy the full range of first
amendment rights possessed by adults. 2' As Justice Stewart has observed:
"A state may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the pre-
supposition of the First Amendment guarantees." 22 Following this view, it
is often asserted that high school students are too young, immature and
unsophisticated to deal with political issues and political organizations
which might seek to take advantage of an assemblage of high school
students.23 Similarly, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between high
school-age and college-age students in Tilton v. Richardson,24 a case
challenging the Higher Education Facilities Act of 196325 which provides
federal construction grants for college and university facilities and which
excludes any facility to be used for sectarian instruction. In holding that
the Act authorized grants to church-related schools, and in sustaining the
Act's constitutionality, the Court noted that in the university setting there
is less danger that religion will permeate the area of secular education than
in primary and secondary schools dealing with impressionable children. A
California appellate court, in Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School
District,26 distinguished the associational rights of adults from those of
adolescents, stating that the first amendment guarantee of the right of free
assembly as applied to adults was not at issue because the court was dealing
with adolescents in their formative years. There, the court upheld a state
statute which forbade high school student membership in social fraternities
or sororities on the ground that the statute dealt with "activities which
reach into the school and which reasonably may be said to interfere with
the educational process [and] with the morale of high school student
bodies as a whole .... ,,27
2 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). But see notes 77-94 infra & text
accompanying.22Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)
(concurring opinion).2 5See Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).
This was a proceeding on high school students' motion for a preliminary injunction against
enforcement by school officials of a rule prohibiting the students' solicitation of funds from
other public school pupils. The motion was denied. School officials contended that where
outside organizations or individuals espousing various causes seek to take advantage of the
required assemblage of secondary school pupils as a captive audience to solicit funds either
directly or through the agency of some of the pupils for their particular project or cause, they
are in effect in competition for the time, attention and interest of the pupils with those who
are seeking to administer the school system. This situation was said to be plainly harmful to
the operation of the public schools.
24403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971).
2520 U.S.C. §§ 711-721 (1970) (repealed 1972). The challenge was to the Act as applied.
26245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 291, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792 (1966).
271d. at 278, 291, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (1966).
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Ginsberg v. New York2s has been cited for the proposition that even in
the analogous area of free expression, important consequences can be made
to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor.29 Ginsberg held
that it is not constitutionally impermissible to accord minors under
seventeen years of age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to
judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read and
see. 0 When dealing with non-obscene erotic expression, it has been stated
that immaturity and other factors justify imposition of rules on the world
of children that are not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression.3 1
Even where adults enjoy a protected freedom, "the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults .... ,S2 But while acknowledging its position in Ginsberg,33 the
Court later clarified its position, saying that minors are entitled to a
significant degree of first amendment protection and that only in well-
defined circumstances may the government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them.34
Thus, minors, while possibly not possessing the full range of first
amendment freedoms as adults, are no longer seen by the courts as persons
without substantial first amendment rights.
THE CHANGING VIEW OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS
Since Brown v. Board of Education,3 5 the courts have exhibited a
changing role concerning public education.36 Showing less deference to
28390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2 9Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1053 (1969). But see
Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 278, 286 (1970), arguing that application of the Ginsberg rationale to first
amendment rights in general is misconceived because obscenity has consistently been denied
first amendment protection. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
30Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).
3Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939
(1963).32 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (Court upheld a law interpreted to
prohibit distribution of religious materials by children).
33390 U.S. 629 (1968).34Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975) (citation omitted).
55347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court held that segregation of white and Negro children in
the public schools of a state solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or
requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, even though the physical facilities and other
tangible factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.
36Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 612 (1970).
There may be some indication that the Court is now reversing this trend as seen in the
recent school desegregation or school busing cases. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2677 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Any such trend,
however, seems to be limited to such cases, and the Court has since dealt with other instances
where education or school administration is involved. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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school authorities, in the last decade the courts have often held that
constitutional guarantees are protected in education facilities, while still
recognizing that school authorities must have the powers necessary to
control and correct the behavior of students in their charge.3 7 No longer
embracing the implied contract or privilege theories of education, the
Supreme Court has characterized education as a property interest.38 The
Court has pointed out that although there is no constitutional right to an
education at public expense, once the state has chosen to extend the right to
an education to its citizens it may not withdraw that right without
adherence to the minimum procedures required by the due process clause.3 9
Now, too, the assertion that the doctrine of in loco parentis justifies the
school's domination of the student is considered to be largely unaccept-
able4" as it is far too vague and unlimited a doctrine, susceptible to abuse by
school authorities. 4' Blackstone's common law conception of school
authority was based on the view that parental authority was given up to the
school, but that doctrine predated extensive state involvement in public
education. Today, the school board is not a private agency designed to
fulfill parental desires, but rather is a public agency operating under a
legislative delegation of authority.42 The mere statement that a school is in
loco parentis should not dissolve the restrictions on all public agency
actions that abridge first amendment rights. 43 Notwithstanding the large
grants of power by state legislatures, school authorities are not at liberty to
promulgate any and all rules related to the educational structure regardless
of the effect such rules may have on other societal interests. 44 Further, the
fact that a parent or the community might object provides no justification
for the denial of first amendment rights of children other than their own,
including the right to gather to discuss political views. In another context
the doctrine of in loco parentis was given a restricted application:
The constitution of the United States does not vest in objectors the
right to preclude other students who may voluntarily desire to participate
in a course of study under the guise that the objector's liberty, personal
37Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 612 (1970).
38See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
391d.
40See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968).41See Comment, Colleges and Universities: The Demise of In Loco Parentis, 6 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 715, 723 (1971). Although this comment deals chiefly with the university
setting, it draws analogies to the lower level educational settings and cites cases dealing with
both secondary and elementary schools.42Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969).
43Note, First Amendment Right of Association for High School Student - Robinson v.
Sacramento City Unified School District, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 911, 917 (1967).
44Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
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happiness or parental authority is somehow jeopardized or impaired. To
adhere to such a concept would use judicial constitutional authority to
limit inquiry to conformity, and to limit knowledge to the known. 45
Contemporary students are more mature and sophisticated than those
in the past. The influences of television and other mass media on the
perspectives of even very young children are pervasive. 46 The message of
the courts today may well be that in terms of student maturity and
consequent educational function, the lines between the high school and
college or university are not so clear-cut as once was thought. 47 Thus, the
position that the utilization of the doctrine of in loco parentis is in the
interest of the students' welfare and guidance is no longer a sufficiently
compelling reason to deny first amendment rights of high school students.
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
Although the larger part of the case law dealing with the first
amendment as it affects high school students concerns speech and expres-
sion rather than association, such cases may be used as a basis of analogy in
analyzing the issues of students' associational rights. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,4 the Supreme Court
upheld the right of public school students peacefully protesting the
Vietnam War to wear black armbands on school premises. The majority
held that such expression may not be prohibited or punished where the
school authorities have not shown that it will cause, or has resulted in, a
material and substantial interference with school activities. 49 The Court
placed the burden of justifying any prohibition of a student's expression on
school authorities.50 In addition, Tinker is important because it extended
the right of students to wear armbands to the classroom itself, despite the
distracting effect, short of disruption, which might result.51
In Tinker, the Court used two approaches to determine the validity of
the regulation. 52 First, it focused on the factual underpinnings of the
regulation. Finding that it was not based on a reasonable forecast of
45Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo, 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 91
(1975) (parents of school children unsuccessfully challenged a family life and sex education
program in the San Mateo County schools).
4"Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 612, 615 (1970).47Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of
Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479, 1491 (1972).




5 Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278, 280 (1970).52Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of
Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479, 1483 (1972).
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disruption, but instead on mere apprehension and the desire to avoid
controversy, 3 the Court held that the students could not be disciplined for
disobeying the regulation. Second, the Court independently reviewed the
record to ascertain how the plaintiff students conducted themselves and how
other students reacted. It was in this connection that the Court found no
material disruption had occurred. 54
While courts have also upheld the right of students to publish
controversial matter in newspapers s and to publish "underground news-
papers," 6 the first amendment protects more than freedom of symbolic
expression and freedom of the press:
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of
individuals to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of
association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been
held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and petition.
... There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, withoutjustification . . . burdens or abridges that associational right.5 7
Indeed, political organizations are afforded special protections as speech
and associational activity of a fairly high order.5 8 Freedom to associate
with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a
form of "orderly group activity" protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments.5 9
This is not to say, however, that the right of association or any other
first amendment right is necessarily absolute. Courts have applied a
"balancing of interests" test when a first amendment right appears to be
inconsistent with some other governmental interest.60  Yet students'
53Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969).
-
41d. at 514.55E.g., Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).5 6E.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Jacobs v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 349 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
S7Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). The right of association can be traced back to
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875): "The very idea of a government, republican
in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for a consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." Id. at 552. More recent
cases include NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).5 See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Riddell v. National Democratic
Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975); United States Labor Party v. Codd, 391 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); New Left Educ. Project v. Board of Regents, 326 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
59Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
60A recurrent theme in modern first amendment adjudication has been the debate over
whether first amendment rights are "absolute" or whether first amendment interpretation
requires the balancing of competing interests. Konigsberg v. State Bar provides an example of
this debate: "At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association.., are
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associational rights are not to be dealt with lightly. The Supreme Court
has upheld the associational rights of university students in Healy v.
James.6t The Court in that instance held that in a college setting, insofar
as the denial of official recognition of the student group was based on an
assumed relationship with the National SDS, was the result of admini-
strative disagreement with the group's philosophy or was the result of an
unsubstantiated fear of disruption, the college administrator's decision
violated the students' first amendment rights.62
'absolutes'...." 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). On the other hand, in the same case Justice Black in
dissent stated:
I do not subscribe to ["the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to
be 'balanced' away whenever a majority of this court thinks that a State might have
interest sufficient to justify abridgement of those freedoms"] for I believe that the
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the
rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of
Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field.
Id. at 61. See also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("[T]he
protection of free speech even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.") (Hughes,
C.J.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) ("But, although the rights of free speech
and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute.") (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) ("I do not doubt for a moment
that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United
States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United
States constitutionally may seek to prevent.") (Holmes, J., dissenting).
If there is to be a balancing of interests, however, such an issue might arise where
freedom of association is inconsistent with some other governmental interest such as the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race or sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); 20
U.S.C. 1681 (Supp. V 1975). Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 372 F. Supp.
126, 144-45 (D. Miss. 1974), supplemented, 378 F. Supp. 1251 (1974), provides an example.
There, the district court found that the sponsorship of 4-H clubs and homemaker clubs by a
state agency constituted significant involvement of the state with the private association of
club members and forbade the state from engaging in action that had a significant tendency to
facilitate, enforce or support private discrimination. The court directed the state to take
reasonable steps to eliminate discriminatory practices by local clubs including sponsorship of
youth activities at racially segregated private schools. Thus, by the withdrawal or refusal of
support, the state would be interfering with the students' absolute rights of association in a
constitutionally permissible way. The Seventh Circuit has agreed that in appropriate cases
the state may thus be precluded from expressly permitting private discriminatory conduct.
Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970). While the court found
that the evidence failed to show actual racial discrimination against black students with
respect to school symbols, i.e., a school flag resembling the Confederate flag and the name
"Rebels" for athletic teams, it recommended that school authorities exercise their discretion to
bring about the elimination of such school symbols which are offensive to a racial minority.
The court stated that in appropriate cases, the state may be precluded from expressly
permitting private discriminatory conduct and that if evidence of actual discrimination arose
in the future, an action might be brought at that time.
61408 U.S. 169 (1972).
621d. at 186-94. The Court mentioned three situations in which official recognition could
be denied: (1) upon the establishment of a knowing affiliation with an organization
possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims; (2)
upon a showing that the organization posed a substantial threat of material disruption; and




In order to abridge the first amendment freedom of association, the
state must advance a "compelling interest." 63 Moreover, the Constitution's
protection is not limited to direct interference with associational rights but
also protects such rights from more subtle interference, such as the
requirement of disclosure of membership lists 64 or the denial of privileges
contingent upon a grant of official recognition of an organization. 65 Just as
in the community at large, a school may promulgate reasonable rules as to
time, place and manner of expression.66 Such rules, however, must pass the
stringent test set out in United States v. O'Brien67 and in Brandenburg v.
Ohio;6  even though the regulation is within the constitutional power of
the government, it must further a substantial governmental interest which
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental
restriction on first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest. As a less drastic alternative to denial of
recognition, the Court in Healy suggested an initial grant of official
recognition with withdrawal of recognition to follow if serious problems
developed, 69 or withholding recognition from those groups which reserved
the right to violate valid campus rules.70
Moreover, denial of recognition acts as a prior restraint on the freedoms
of speech, assembly and association of organization members in that it
curbs those freedoms before they have been abused or even exercised.7'
While a school has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on
campus, it should bear a heavy burden of demonstrating the appropriate-
ness of the prior restraint.7 2 Although not unconstitutional per se, "[a]ny
system of prior restraints of expression comes to [the United States
Supreme Court] bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
63See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
64NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
65Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
661d. at 192-93.
In Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, the district court granted a permanent injunction
against school officials enjoining them from enforcing a rule suppressing and prohibiting
distribution of a publication on school grounds irrespective of disruption. The court said
such a rule was not a legitimate exercise of the board's power to regulate time, place and
manner of distribution. 394 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ind. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973),
vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
67391 U.S. 366, 377 (1968).
68395 U.S. 444 (1969). In holding the Ohio criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional
the Court held that since the statute, on its face and as applied, purported to punish mere
advocacy and to forbid assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action, it
fell within the condemnation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
69Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 n.24 (1972).
701d. at 193-94.
711d.; Comment, Withholding Official Recognition from Radical Student Groups: A
Denial of First Amendment Rights, 57 IowA L. REv. 937 (1972).72Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972).
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validity,"73 and the government carries the burden of showing justification
for the imposition of restraint.7 4  A system of prior restraint avoids
constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. 75  The Supreme
Court also has held that even when a governmental purpose is legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that "broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of the legislative abridgement must be viewed in
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."7 6 It is not
likely that :the denial of official recognition would often be the "least
drastic means" available to prevent campus disruption or to further
educational interests.
The Supreme Court has remarked that the "vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." 77 Even though most high school students are minors,
they are still "persons" under the Constitution, possessing rights that the
state must respect.78 The right to receive information is included in the
first amendment liberties79 and the state may not suppress ideas because it
thinks them unsuitable8 0 or not approved for young people.8 ' Directing
itself to the high school community in Shanley v. Northeast Independent
School District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
said:
One of the great concerns of our time is that our young people,
disillusioned by our political processes, are disengaging from political
participation. It is most important that our youth become convinced that
our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass.
7Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See New York Times C6. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
74Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). See the Supreme
Court's recommendations for "an appropriate framework" for consideration of organizations'
applications for official recognition in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
7"Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
76Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
77Id. at 487.
7"Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969);
accord, Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (right of
privacy, including access to non-prescription contraceptive&, not necessarily inapplicable to
minor persons under the age of sixteen); People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444, 335 N.E.2d
612 (1975) (curfew law for persons under eighteen years of age incompatible with constitu-
tional guarantees); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) (rule that unmarried
minor woman obtain parental consent for abortion unduly infringed on her constitutional
rights).
79See ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
8 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). A city ordinance making it a
public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films
containing nudity where the screen was visible from a public street was held facially invalid as
an infringement of first amendment rights.
81Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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Our 18-year-olds can now vote, serve on juries, and be drafted; yet the
[school] board fears the "awakening" of their intellects without reasoned
concern for its effect upon school discipline. The First Amendment
cannot tolerate such intolerance.8 2
Indeed, the school may not penalize partisan ideas" such as those that may
be raised by a high school political organization. Nor may it restrict speech
or association because it finds the views expressed are in disagreement with
those of the administration, 4 abhorrent,85 offensive to the administration
or community, s6 distasteful to others,8 7 or controversial.88  The first
amendment requires that government have no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.8 9 Nor does
the first amendment tolerate expression restricted to unnecessarily limited
locations. Speaking specifically of the school environment, the Court has
stated:
The principle [of freedom of expression] is not confined to the
supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.
A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
"materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" and without
colliding with the rights of others.
We properly read [the Constitution] to permit reasonable regulation
of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we
62462 F.2d 960, 972, 978 (5th Cir. 1972) (school board policy of prohibiting distribution
of petitions or printed documents of any kind without specific approval of high school
principal was unconstitutionally applied).83Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972) (complaint that principal denied
students the opportunity to express and promote a partisan point of view within the high
school should not have been dismissed for lack of substantial federal question).
4Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
85 Id.56Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974) (fact that officials of
state university found expressions of gay students abhorrent could not provide important
governmental interest upon which to predicate impairment of organization's first amendment
rights).87Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).88Dixon v. Beresh, 361 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Mich. 1973). School officials refused to
recognize a voluntary unincorporated association of high school students organized to discuss
and advance ideas, intluding those of a political nature. The court held the refusal
unconstitutional where it was uncontroverted that the organization had not advocated and
was not advocating disrupting or impairing normal operations of the school and where the
denial was based on the principal's interpretation of policy forbidding the school to afford
recognition to student groups which advocated controversial ideas or stressed one side of
issues.
89Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a
telephone booth or the four comers of a pamphlet, or to supervised and
ordained discussion in a school classroom.90
Thus, there is no reason to distinguish students' rights of association and
the right to organize and gather to discuss political issues from their right
to freedom of speech. All of these rights should be protected. Neither the
high school student's age, nor his position as a student are, in themselves,
disabilities for which the enjoyment of important constitutional rights may
be denied. The need for a learning environment free from disruption
should not be minimized, but neither should students' rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of association.
CONCLUSION
The withholding of official recognition from a high school political
organization in the absence of some competing compelling interest, such as
a finding that such an organization would materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school,9 ' and in the absence of procedural safeguards, constitutes an
infringement of the students' first amendment rights of association. 92
School administrators should be encouraged to adopt the standards of
material and substantial disruption as discussed in Tinker93 and the
framework outlined in Healy v. James94 and the various other first
amendment cases,95 in deciding whether to grant or deny official recog-
nition to high school political organizations. Once a group of students
undertakes to obtain official recognition of its organization, the Healy
framework outlined in Healy v. James94 and the various other first
decision it might make in rejecting recognition of the organization while
reserving the right to the administration to withdraw or suspend recogni-
tion, once accorded, if the organization's members fail to abide by valid
campus rules.96 Such procedures balance the needs of the various parties
and provide a fair and reasonably unbiased framework for making such
decisions.
RENEE MAWHINNEY
9 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969).91d. at 511. Various other reasons for denying first amendment rights have been rejected
by the courts; see notes 80, 81, 84-89 supra & text accompanying.92While it may seem that the Court is drawing away from education litigation or
becoming more conservative on such issues, the trend seems to be limited to those cases
involving school desegregation. The Court has not changed significantly regarding first
amendment rights of school children. See note 37 supra.
93See notes 48-54 supra & text accompanying.
94Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
95See note 91 supra.
91See notes 62, 69-76 supra & text accompanying.
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